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Abstract
Despite South Africa￿ s relatively decentralized governance and administrative structure, an
important feature of the country￿ s intergovernmental ￿scal relations system is the gap that exists
between the expenditure responsibilities of sub-national authorities and their assigned revenue
bases. The resulting vertical ￿scal imbalance is mainly addressed via signi￿cant intergovernmen-
tal transfers to provinces and local governments. This factor presents strong a priori grounds in
assuming that in the South African context, the heavy dependence of many local governments
on intergovernmental transfers may generate ￿scal illusion. Despite this, no signi￿cant e⁄ort
has been geared towards an empirical investigation of the issue of ￿scal illusion. This paper
extends existing literature on the empirical analysis of ￿scal illusion by using the ￿scal year
2005/06 ￿nancial and expenditure data from 237 local government authorities in South Africa
to evaluate the ￿ ypaper variant of the ￿scal illusion hypothesis. Empirical results indicate that
the marginal e⁄ects of municipal own-source revenues on local expenditure exceed those of in-
tergovernmental transfers. This outcome yields no statistical evidence in support of the ￿ ypaper
hypothesis within the context of municipal expenditures in South Africa.
JEL Classi￿cation: C20, H20, H71, H72, H77
Keywords: Intergovernmental Transfers; Fiscal Illusion; Flypaper E⁄ect; South Africa. .
1 Introduction
The median voter theorem of public choice posits that under a under a majority-rule voting system,
the e⁄ects of any system of revenue sharing can be duplicated by a set of grants (of the same amount)
to individuals in a community or jurisdiction (Hotelling, 1929; Black, 1948; Downs, 1957; Brandford
and Oates, 1971; Congleton, 2002) From a quantitative viewpoint, this theorem implies that where
increases in non-matching, non-categorical grants to a community are appropriately weighted by the
median voter￿ s tax share, then the increase in public spending should be proportional to the increase
in the median voter￿ s income, that is, that intergovernmental block aid and voter income should
have identical e⁄ects on local government expenditure (Turnbull, 1991; Wycko⁄, 1988). However,
empirical evidence in a number of studies has found that the median-voter model prediction of
equivalence is consistently rejected by the data (see for example Gramlich, 1977; Fisher, 1982; and
Hamilton, 1983). Instead, the empirical results report a phenomenon in which increases in lump
sum intergovernmental grants e⁄ects a larger increase in local government expenditures than an
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they may be involved with. The authors wish to thank Krish Chetty for his technical input and Njeri Wabiri for
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1equivalent change in residential incomes (Megdal, 1987; Courant et al., 1979). This empirically
observed asymmetry between the income and grant e⁄ects on local government expenditures is
termed the ￿￿ ypaper e⁄ect￿to explain the observed tendency for local government authorities to
spend intergovernmental grant transfers rather than pass on such transfers to constituents/residents
through, for example, tax cuts.
The ￿ ypaper e⁄ect of intergovernmental grants can be traced back to the concept of ￿scal illusion.
This concept is premised on the proposition that in a given ￿scal jurisdiction, the separation of
taxing and spending powers blurs local taxpayers￿ judgment of the ￿ true￿ costs and bene￿ts of
public expenditure and/or publicly provided goods and services (Dollery and Worthington, 1999).
According to Grossman (1990), the obfuscation of costs stems from the perception that grants
received by a particular jurisdiction will not be paid for by higher tax payments of equal value to
the grantor government. Such grants will therefore cause both income and price e⁄ects on local
demand for public goods and services, e⁄ects that result in the size of government expenditure
(or the local public sector) being larger than what will obtain in a system of ￿scally independent
local authorities. The empirical analysis of ￿scal illusion involves the examination of ￿ve underlying
but distinct hypotheses of ￿scal illusion, namely: (i) the revenue complexity, (ii) revenue-elasticity,
(iii) the ￿ypaper paper e⁄ect, (iv) renter illusion and, (v) the debt illusion hypothesis, respectively.
According to Dollery and Worthington (1996), the common trend across these hypotheses is that
they each attempt to model a process in which ￿scal illusion causes citizens to underestimate the
tax-price of a public good (or services), the consequence of which is the oversupply of that good (or
service).
An empirical evaluation of the concept of ￿scal illusion is important to decentralization policies
in South Africa for several reasons. First, in the context of South Africa￿ s intergovernmental ￿scal
relations, the notion of ￿scal illusion is likely to become an important theme in research geared
towards understanding local public choice and the process of public expenditures at sub-national
spheres. Recent reforms to the ￿nancial and management systems of local governments, increased
demand for service delivery at the local government sphere and growing concerns about the capacity
of the local governments to implement critical service delivery initiatives has not only led to the re-
examination of the ￿scal relationships between the three spheres of government in South Africa but
also, a growing need to align intergovernmental grants allocations with the true costs of providing
local public goods and services. Second, the legislative assignment of relatively broader revenue
sources (including rates on property and utility user - fees on water, electricity and sanitation
services provided by a municipality) to the local sphere ensures that at an aggregate level, South
Africa￿ s municipalities are able to generate over 90 percent of their revenues from own-sources.
However, disparities in population size, income distribution, revenue base as well as varying degrees
in the levels of urbanization and administrative capacity means that the actual distribution of
responsibilities and revenue collection varies widely within and across types of local governments.
(Bahl and Smoke, 2003). As a way of equalizing services across municipalities as well as ￿lling the
gap between constitutionally mandated responsibilities and revenue functions, intergovernmental
￿scal transfers (or grant allocations) play a crucial role in the expenditure functions of relatively
poor municipalities. As Wycko⁄ (1991) has noted, lump-sum intergovernmental grants represent
one of the few observable exogenous variables impacting on real world public ￿nance decisions ￿
a reason that allows for the construction and testing of consistent models estimating the e⁄ects of
intergovernmental grants on spending decisions of local authorities.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature on the ￿scal behavior of local authorities in
Africa. First, to the best of our knowledge, there is no parallel work in South Africa, and indeed in
the rest of Africa that has quantitatively analyzed the concept of ￿scal illusion and by extension, the
role of intergovernmental transfers on spending decisions of local governments.1 Second, our analysis
1Dalamagas (1993) empirically analyzed the e⁄ects of government de￿cit (and debt) on private consumption using
a sample of 51 countries that included South Africa. Of some relevance to this paper is that the study utilized the
￿scal illusion hypothesis as a means of reconciling the conventional Keynesian theory on the macroeconomic e⁄ects
2is carried out within the framework of the median voter model, a model that underpins the ￿ ypa-
per e⁄ect hypothesis of ￿scal illusion. Unlike national and provincial spheres where multi-sectoral
issues (like macroeconomic stability, defence and social welfare) are priorities, the South African
constitution mandates that local authorities focus on providing public goods and this most likely
adheres to the classical unidimensional assumptions of the median-voter model, thereby justifying
the application of the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect hypothesis to the analysis of ￿scal illusion in the case of South
Africa.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a review of relevant theoretical
and empirical literature on assessing ￿scal illusion using the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect hypothesis. Section 3
provides an overview of South Africa￿ s local government grant process and is followed by Section
4 which elaborates on the data and methodological issues. Section 5 presents the empirical results
and their interpretation. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
2.1 The Theory
Following Dollery and Worthington (1996), the starting point in analyzing the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect is the
illustration of the theoretical framework underpinning the empirical evaluation of the ￿scal illusion
phenomenon. This is illustrated using the simple diagram developed by Wagner (1976) and presented
in Figure 1.
Assuming perfect competition, X2and P2 represent the desired output and tax-price of the public
good in the absence of ￿scal illusion, with total budget corresponding to the area OP2aX 2. According
to public ￿nance theory, ￿scal illusion is likely to cause the oversupply of a public good owing to
citizens￿underestimation of the price of that good and the characteristics of the good, that is, whether
it has positive or negative externalities associated with it. From Figure 1, when there is ￿scal illusion,
the perceived price of the public good declines to P1;causing an increase in desired output to rise to
X1 with the corresponding (perceived) budget equivalent to the area OP1cX 1:However, in since the
actual price of the good is still P2;the actual budget corresponds to the area OP2dX 1:Along with
the four other hypotheses utilized in explaining the concept of ￿scal illusion, the ￿￿ ypaper e⁄ect￿
theory is used to construct empirical models in evaluating the area X2adX 1;which denotes the excess
budget attributable to ￿scal illusion.
Having outlined the theory of ￿scal illusion, the paper now turns its attention to the theoretical
equivalence of the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect examining the impact of lump-sum grants on governments and
residents as developed by Bradford and Oates (1971) and adapted from the studies of Fisher (1982)
and Wycko⁄ (1988). This is illustrated in Figure 2 below.
In the illustration above, an unconditional or unrestricted grant equal to the amount Bpushes
out the median voter￿ s budget constraint (from BC I to BC II) but leaves the slope una⁄ected,
i.e. the slope of BC I and BC II are equal to T. If T is equivalent to the median voter￿ s tax
share, then an income increase equal to an amount TB will result in exactly the same ￿nal budget
constraint as that which occurs under a grant/aid increase (Wycko⁄, 1988). Assuming that the
voter￿ s preferred choices are independent of the elements of the budget constraint, one can expect
the same equilibrium expenditure on public and private goods to occur, and thus, that an increase
in unconditional grants to a particular region (or government jurisdiction) of amount B to have the
same e⁄ect as an income increase (or the transfer of an equivalent lump-sum amount to citizens
of that jurisdiction) of amount TB). Lump-sum grants change spending patterns by altering the
median voter￿ s e⁄ective income. With the median voter assumed to have the ability to vary local
public spending to suit her tastes, then that voter￿ s share of lump-sum grants can be considered to
be a fungible asset which could be utilized for either private or public purposes, thus forming part
of a debt-￿nanced tax cut with the e⁄ects postulated by the alternative Ricardian equivalence hypothesis.
3of the voter￿ s total income.2 In the median voter model, the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect happens when increases
in the share of lump-sum aid coincides with a larger level of local expenditures than increases in the
median voter￿ s income (Wycko⁄, 1991; Heyndels and Smolders, 1994).
From the perspectives of Courant et al (1979) and Oates (1979), the observed tendency for
lump-sum grants to stimulate higher public expenditures than equivalent increases in other revenue
sources is mainly due to the behavior of budget maximizing bureaucrats and politicians to project
the illusion that lump-sum allocations reduce both the actual average tax rates paid by citizens and
the marginal tax-price of public goods provided to citizens. Courant et al (1979) and Oates (1979)
argue that little knowledge regarding the amount of grants extended to the community will result
in the voter using the ratio of his tax payments to total expenditures as a proxy estimate for the
marginal cost of public goods. Thus, where lump-sum transfers are present, the use of this proxy
will cause the voter to make erroneous estimates of his e⁄ective income and price of public goods.
In a situation where the median voter￿ s tax payments remain unchanged and lump sum grants raise
local expenditures, the average price of public goods will then decline causing consumers to perceive
a fall in tax price and demand larger expenditure levels (Heyndels and Smolders, 1994).
Using the expenditure behavior model developed by Logan (1986), Hammes and Wills (1987)
postulate that an expansion in public expenditure due to lump-sum grant transfers is the outcome
of the spending behavior of both recipient and grantor governments. With lump sum transfers
raising the perceived price of grantor government expenditures and lowering the perceived price of
recipient government expenditures, then such price changes will encourage individuals ￿over-buying￿
of recipient government expenditures and ￿under-buying￿grantor government expenditures. Federal
transfers such as non-matching grants or categorical lump-sum grants a⁄ord political agents the
opportunity to return to taxpayers, either directly (via rebates) or indirectly (via a reduction in
tax contributions), some of the income derived from grant revenues. However, given that there are
greater political gains to be derived from increased public expenditure than o⁄ering minor reductions
in tax rates paid by citizens, politicians will tend to utilize lump-sum grant allocations in expanding
the public budget.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
In quantitatively examining the concept of ￿scal illusion using the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect, two distinct
groups of research can be identi￿ed. Rather than a direct assessment of the ￿ y paper e⁄ect, the ￿rst
set of studies have followed an indirect route by incorporating expenditure distortions generated
by intergovernmental grants into empirical studies of other theories of ￿scal illusion, such as the
revenue-complexity or elasticity hypotheses (see for example Oates, 1975; Wagner, 1976; Heyndels
and Smolders, 1994). Generally, the results of these studies conclude that intergovernmental grants
are a key determinant of expenditures on public goods and services. The second set of studies have
followed a more direct approach with attention devoted to the empirical analysis of ￿scal illusion
using the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect hypothesis. Within this category of direct analysis, there are two distinct
approaches: (i) one in which the analysis of the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect is based on the premise that grants
lower the average price of recipient public goods, and it is this price rather than the actual marginal-
tax price, that forms the basis of voter￿ s allocative decisions), and (ii) an alternative approach that
considers the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect as the result of a ￿windfall illusion￿ .3 Irrespective of this distinction,
a common view held by both direct approaches is that by reducing the perceived marginal cost of
2 Wycko⁄ (1988) further cites the example of the case where a median voter opts to spend his share of lump-sum
grants on private consumption. In such a case, the grant share will be directed towards lowering the median voter￿ s
local taxes, with the voter￿ s after-tax income increasing by the product of (i) the lump-sum grant, (ii) the voter￿ s tax
share, and (iii) the community or jurisdiction￿ s share of expenditures under any matching grant scheme.
3Windfall illusion describes the case in which the voter is conscious of grant transfers but perceives an increase
in such grant as (i) an increase in income (and not a fall in marginal cost of public goods), and (ii) an increase in
income ￿nanced by other jurisdictions.
4the public goods, grants have the e⁄ect of biasing public expenditures upwards (Worthington and
Dollery, 1996). The two strands of the direct approach are discussed below.
Amongst studies that have followed the direct approach, the pioneering work of Winer (1983)
which examined provincial data for Canada is particularly instructive. In Winer￿ s view, while voters
are aware that federal taxes are levied nationally and that some of these taxes are transferred as aid
to recipient provincial government(s), they tend to believe that the funding for such aid is derived
from taxes levied on residents of other jurisdictions. The result is a decline in the relative (tax)
price of the public good provided by the recipient government and a possible increase in the levels of
public expenditure. Winer￿ s empirical analysis of this ￿scal illusion utilized pooled time series and
cross sectional data covering ten Canadian provinces. Regressing net provincial expenditures against
interprovincial grants, provincial income, federal grants and dummy variables capturing the di⁄erent
categories of recipient (or poor) and donor (rich) provinces, Winer ￿nds that the Canadian grant
system does raise expenditure with the elasticity expenditure of grants for recipient governments
twice as large as donor jurisdictions.
The seminal works of Logan (1986) for the United States, and Hammes & Wills (1987) for
Canada extended Winer￿ s study to include the analysis of the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect on the expenditures
of both the aid granting and aid receiving government/jurisdiction. Their analysis was based on
the argument that while voters lacked complete information, they still acted like rational agents in
making economic decisions. Thus, when faced with the perception that federal taxes were rising but
services were not (and vice versa), the dissimilar e⁄ects of misperceived tax prices would lead to the
increase in expenditures of the recipient government, and a downward bias in non-grant expenditures
of the aid granting (i.e. donor) government (Dollery and Worthington, 1996). In both Logan (1986)
and Hammes and Wills (1987), the empirical analysis of the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect was undertaken by
regressing real per capita federal (non-aid) direct expenditures against per capita measures of federal
aid, total sub-federal government expenditures and unemployment. Both studies reported an inverse
correlation between federal (non-aid) direct spending and aid disbursed to sub-federal government
authorities. For Hammes and Wills (1987), the results indicating that intergovernmental grants
transfer incomes and alter the relative price of grantor to recipient government expenditures provides
support for the existence of ￿scal illusion using Canadian data.
Extending the argument of Courant et al.(1979), Grossman (1990) noted that the higher the
indirectness of grant transfer and the greater the degree of separation between taxing and spending
powers, the higher the distortion of taxpayers￿perception of the true costs of locally provided goods
and services. In Grossman￿ s opinion, the transfer of funds from the federal government to local
authorities is more indirect with the relationship involving a greater separation in tax and spending
powers, with the resultant e⁄ects that federal grants stimulate local expenditures far higher than
state grants. To test this hypothesis, Grossman (1990) utilized data on the recurrent expenditures
of 136 counties and cities in the state of Virginia, and regressed these expenditures against various
socio-economic variables and categories of grants (i.e. conditional and unconditional) disbursed by
both the federal and state governments. The results supported those of Courant et al (1979) and
Oates (1979), as it found that federal government unconditional grants generate twice as much
increase in local expenditures than an equivalent state government unconditional grant.
3 An Overview of South Africa￿ s Local Government Grant
Process
The democratic elections of 1994 ushered in a phase of signi￿cant reforms and encompassed the po-
litical and socio-economic system under which South Africa would operate. The 1996 Constitution
and Local Government Municipal Structures Act (1998) consolidated the complex system of local
authorities into two hundred and eighty four local governments subdivided into three categories:
6 metropolitan (or Category A) municipalities that exclusively cover large urban areas; 231 local
5(or category B) municipalities covering non-metropolitan localities that vary in size and degree of
urbanization, and 47 district (or category C) municipalities encompassing several less capacitated
category B and rural municipalities. These two legal frameworks have mandated municipal govern-
ments to give priority to the provision of basic socio-economic services and infrastructures to their
communities. At present, about two-thirds municipal functions relate to the provision of crucial
socio-economic services including water, sanitation, roads, storm water drainage and electricity. To
meet their legislated mandate, local governments in South Africa are assigned a number of revenue
sources by the Constitution, with the main sources being rates on property and utility/user charges
levied on for the services provided by (or on behalf of) municipal authorities (see Figure 3).
While for many well eendowed municipalities, assigned revenue sources provide for relatively
adequate funding and provision of mandated social services, many municipalities (especially those
in small, rural settings) lack adequate ￿scal capacity in meeting their constitutional mandates. For
such municipalities, intergovernmental ￿scal transfers provide crucial resources for funding service
delivery programs and administration costs. In April 1998, the National Treasury (then known as the
Department of Finance) issued a comprehensive document called the ￿Green Book￿which outlined
a new system of intergovernmental transfers to the local sphere of government in South Africa. The
Green Book￿ s major focus was on the framework underpinning the horizontal allocation of the share
of nationally raised revenues (or the equitable share)due to municipalities. The proposed framework
for the horizontal split of revenues mirrored that developed in a policy discussion document published
by the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC, 1997).
The initial sharing mechanism developed by National Treasury proposed that allocations of
equitable share transfers be made up of four separate transfer programs, with amounts allocated
to each municipality being a function of four separate formulas. The proposed transfer programs
included: (i) a municipal basic services (S) grant that was set equal to the cost of providing services
to poor households in each municipality; (ii) a tax base equalization (T) grant designed to reduce
￿scal disparities among sub-structures within each municipal areas; (iii) a municipal institution (I)
grant to aid the costs of governance and administration of democratic local governments; and, (iv)
a matching (M) grant designed to encourage provision of local public goods having signi￿cant and
positive inter-jurisdictional spillover e⁄ects (Reschovsky, 2003). Since 1998, consolidation of the
complex system of local government and reforms to the powers and functions of municipalities has
also necessitated changes in the mechanism underpinning the allocation of transfers to municipalities.
These changes have resulted in the current system of unconditional grant allocations having three
distinct features (see Amusa et al. 2006). First, transfers received by the local sphere are derived
mainly from nationally raised revenues and fall into two main categories: equitable share allocations
and conditional grants. Equitable allocations are general purpose (or unconditional) grants that are
intended to (i) reduce ￿scal imbalances stemming from the asymmetric matching of revenue and
expenditure functions; and (ii) enable sub-national governments provide basic services and perform
any functions assigned to them. Conditional grants are utilized in addressing inter-jurisdictional
spillovers, meet national redistribution objectives, and aid the implementation of speci￿c national
priorities and policies related to socio-economic services provided by sub-national governments.
Second, although equitable share allocations are provided from nationally raised revenues, the
actual allocation and distribution of funds, that is, the horizontal division, is done through the local
government equitable share (LES) formula developed by the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC)
in conjunction with National Treasury and the Department of Provincial and Local Government
(DPLG). In making allocations to municipalities, the LES formula takes into account four key
factors: (a) the need to ensure that allocations support the capacity of municipalities in providing
basic services and perform functions allocated to them; (b) ￿scal capacity and ￿scal e¢ ciency of
municipalities; (c) the developmental needs of municipalities; and (d) to the extent that information
is available, the degree of poverty and backlogs in municipalities. Based on these principles, the
structure of the present LES formula can be summarized as:
6Grant = BS + D + I ￿ R ￿ C (1)
where BS, D, I and R are the basic services, development, institutional support and revenue-raising
capacity components respectively, while C denotes a stabilization factor.4 Details of the formula are
provided in Appendix A. It is observed from Equation (1) above that the key consideration of the
LES formula is to make allocations based on an objective assessment of the needs and disabilities
of local government authorities. The needs of municipalities relate to their expenditure functions of
providing constitutionally mandated basic services as well as governance and administration, while
their disabilities relate to the amount of revenues that can be generated by applying a standard set
of rates to available revenue instruments.5 With the formula substantially limiting the ability of
individual municipalities to manipulate individual grant allocation, it is often argued that the use
of a formula driven approach has produced a transfer system that is almost exclusively based on the
objective assessment of local government￿ s functional capacity.
Third, unconditional grant allocations form a signi￿cant share of intergovernmental transfers to
the local sphere. Between the 2000/1 ￿2007/08 ￿scal years, about R124 billion representing 4.9
percent of the estimated R 2.5 trillion of nationally raised revenues shared by the three spheres
of government has been transferred to the local government sphere. Of the R124 billion of total
intergovernmental transfers, the shares of equitable share (unconditional) allocations and conditional
grants have averaged 55 and 45 percent, respectively (see Figure 4). While unconditional allocations
are disbursed using the LES formula, the bulk of conditional transfers have been channeled via
the municipal infrastructure grant (MIG). Approved by the South African Cabinet in March 2003,
the MIG is a consolidated grant mechanism intended to: (a) supplement municipal capital projects
aimed at eradicating backlogs in basic municipal infrastructure especially where such infrastructure
is crucial in supporting national government￿ s objective of expanding delivery of socio-economic
services to poor households, and (b) provide municipalities with a foundation to stimulate local
economic development and job creation (National Treasury, 2007).
4 Methodology and Data Description
4.1 The Empirical Model
The basic empirical framework employed has its foundations in the median voter model developed
in the article by Wycko⁄ (1988, 1991) and adapted in Heyndels and Smolders (1994). It begins by
assuming that the expenditure function of government relies basically on the median voter demand
model, and in this framework, demand for public goods is dependent on the median voter￿ s income
and the tax price of local public goods she demands. This is expressed as:
Qs = P￿
m ￿ Y ￿
m (2)
where Qs represents the demand for public services while Pmand Ymdenote the tax price of local
goods and the median voter￿ s income, respectively. The terms ￿and ￿represent the price and income
elasticities of demand, respectively. In comparison to the median voter-model where the voter is
assumed to be well informed about the true costs of public goods, a primary assumption of ￿scal
illusion models is that in the presence of intergovernmental transfers, the median voter is unaware of
neither the actual tax burden of public goods nor the true nature of the local community￿ s income.
4Since the inception of the current sharing formula, the D component has been set to zero. The formula￿ s imple-
menting authority, the National Treasury, plans to keep this component inactive until a suitable factor or measure
that adequately captures the development needs of local government is develop.
5It is important to note that the disparities in the functional capacity, size and income base of municipalities will
result in the LES formula generating some form of equalization of municipalities capacity to provide services, but not
equalization in the quantity and quality of services delivered.
7In this case, the price of the public good is a perceived price with the median voter￿ s tax price of
locally provided public goods denoted as Pp
m rather than Pm. Assuming that each publicly provided
good (or service) has a unit costcs, then local expenditure on public goods can be expressed as:
E = cs ￿ Qs (3)
Both theoretical and practical evidence suggests that public goods and services are provided
via public facilities. The argument is also advanced that the relationship between facilities and a
publicly provided good depends on the extent to which that particular good is public in nature. In
this sense, the relationship between public facilities and units of the public goods can be expressed
as:
Qf = n￿ ￿ Qs (4)
where Qf stands for units of public facilities, n the population size (of a particular jurisdiction),
and ￿represents the crowding out parameter. In the case of a pure public good the crowding out
parameter equals zero while in the case of pure private goods, the measure is equal to unity (Heyndels
and Smolders, 1994). As with the case of demand for public goods, if we assume that the unit cost
of each public facility is equal to cf, then total expenditure on public goods can be written as:
E = cfxQf (5)
On the basis of the speci￿cation of Qf in Equation (4) above, Equation (5) can be rewritten as
E = cfxnaxQs (6)
The median voter￿ s tax price Pp
m is assumed to be dependent on the share of his taxes in local
taxation. This tax share, expressed as a fraction of total tax revenues (T) raised in the jurisdiction





where Tm represents the median voter￿ s tax share, and ￿m re￿ ects the relative ￿scal pressure for the
median voter. Where the median voter￿ s tax liability is equivalent to the average tax paid in the
community/government jurisdiction then ￿mwill be equal to 1. On the basis of this tax share, the
median voter￿ s unit tax price for locally provided public goods (and services) can be represented as:
Pm = Tm ￿ cs (8)
From Equations (2) and (5) it can be shown that c s = E
Qs and E = cf ￿ n￿ ￿ Qs, respectively.





cf ￿ n￿ ￿ Qs
Qs
= ￿m ￿ T ￿ cf ￿ n(￿￿1) (9)
Equation (2) can thus be re-speci￿ed as:
Qs =
￿




Taking into account the speci￿cations in Equations (2) ￿(10), total local expenditures on public
goods as stated in Equation (3) can thus be re-speci￿ed as:
E = cs ￿
￿




8As not all the explanatory variables are directly relevant or easy to measure, a re￿nement of the
model structure in equation (10) is necessitated. We follow the exposition given in Worthington and
Dollery (1999), and specify an expenditure function for publicly provided goods as:
Q = f(Y;P;Is) (12)
where Q is the level of expenditure on publicly provided goods, Y is the total amount of fungi-
ble resources available for funding such expenditures, P denotes the relative tax-price of Q, and
Iscaptures institutional and demographic factors that impact on local government expenditure out-
comes. Equation (12) thus forms the function to be estimated.
4.2 Data Description
This study utilizes expenditure and ￿nancial data covering the 2005/06 ￿scal period and drawn from
237 category A and B municipalities in South Africa to test the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect hypothesis of ￿scal
illusion. The use of cross sectional data follows other major studies on the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect (see for
example DiLorenzo, 1982; Winer, 1983; Marshall, 1991 as well as Heyndels and Smolders, 1994.),
and more importantly, is imposed upon by the paucity of comprehensive and consistent time series
data on the ￿nances of municipalities in South Africa. The basic model estimated in this study (see
Equation 12) consists of four main variables de￿ned in Table 1 below.
The dependent variable, Q, is the level of per capita expenditures by the i-th municipality. As
noted by Dollery and Worthington (1999), applying the level of expenditure is not the most appro-
priate measure of public good provision as it assumes that output is measured by the value of public
inputs. However as a signi￿cant number of past empirical studies (see for example Nagamine, 1995;
Lalvani, 2002 as well as Sagbas and Saruc, 2004) have demonstrated, the paucity of more suitable
measures makes the level of local expenditure the most appropriate measure of public good provision.
For municipalities constituting the local sphere in South Africa￿ s intergovernmental system, total
fungible resources Y can be divided into two distinct components: (a) own-source revenues mainly
derived from surcharges on fees for basic services (electricity, water and refuse removal) provided by
municipalities, and (b) intergovernmental grant transfers that consists of unconditional and condi-
tional grant allocations. The variable Y is thus de￿ned by the two components L and G. L is de￿ned
as per capita revenue derived from own-revenue sources available in the i-th municipality. A number
of factors support the inclusion of per capita income as an explanatory variable. Using Wagner￿ s
Law, Henrekson and Lybeck (1988) note that ￿growth in income facilitates the relative expansion in
(on public goods)￿ . Furthermore, Marshall (1991) argues that based on the assumption that public
goods may be de￿ned as a normal good, then income serves as a useful estimation of ￿the willingness
to pay for public goods￿ .
The grant variable (G) that is utilized in this study is restricted to transfer allocations disbursed
via the LES formula. Unlike conditional grants which emphasize spending on national priority pro-
grams and often have stringent accounting and planning conditions attached to their use, transfer
allocations via the LES formula are unconditional. This gives municipalities some relative autonomy
(and ￿ exibility) in designing grant expenditure frameworks and altering spending to suit local prior-
ities. In addition, a signi￿cant quantum of intergovernmental transfers (about 60 percent) made to
the local government sphere in South Africa are in the form of unconditional grants funded via the
LES formula. Thus, in the context of South Africa￿ s local government sphere, we de￿ne the variable
G to re￿ ect the amount of per capita intergovernmental unconditional transfers received by i-th
municipality through the LES formula. (see Appendix A for details on grant-sharing mechanism).
The variable P is used to proxy the implicit tax price of own-revenue sources. It re￿ ects the ability
of municipalities to derive revenues from assigned tax bases and is measured as the assessed revenue
need (or the revenue raising capacity) of the i-th municipality as calculated in the LES formula.6
6In the South African case, e⁄orts remain ongoing in establishing adequate measure(s) of revenue raising capacity.
9Finally, Is is measured in terms of the assessed expenditure need of the i-th municipality and
expressed in per capita terms. This variable denotes the ability of a municipality to meet the de-
mands for publicly provided goods required by residents in that jurisdiction. To capture expenditure
needs, we note that in accordance with the provisions of the 1996 Constitution, the core function
of municipalities in South Africa relates to the provision of crucial socio-economic services including
water, sanitation, roads, storm water drainage and electricity. Also, for municipalities to carry out
their Constitutional mandate, there is a recognized need to build, enhance and sustain their institu-
tional capacity. The measure of expenditure need utilized in this study is therefore based on ￿gures
provided in the LES allocation framework. These ￿gures take into account the expenditure needs
(with respect to the available resource envelope) required by municipalities to provide basic social
services and fund the basic costs of administration and governance which are crucial to enhancing
the institutional capacity of local governments.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Model Estimation and Interpretation of Results
The explanatory variables in Equation (12) are by no means exhaustive. By quantifying public
service provision in terms of expenditure, this vector would ideally be made up of a single direct
measure that is able to capture two key factors: (i) citizens/taxpayers preferences for local public
services, and (ii) exogenously imposed disability factors impacting on service provision (Dollery
and Worthington, 1999). For instance, the preferences of citizens may relate to type of sanitation
(ventilated pit latrines or waterborne sewer systems depending on if jurisdiction is rural or urban)
or to the length and type of roads (gravel or tarred), while disability factors relate the topography,
climate and technological constraints faced by the local authority. In this regard, a number of studies
(see for example Wagner, 1976; Munley and Greene, 1978) have included rateable/taxable area and
length of roads provided in the taxable areas as explanatory variables as direct measures quantifying
expenditure on each local government function.
Expansive data on such direct measures are not readily available in South Africa.7 Thus, using
equation (11) and following the conventional approach applied in Courant et al. (1979) and Sagbas
and Saruc (2004), the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect is examined within the context of a linear budget constraint.
The application of a linear budget constraint is consistent with the South African situation where
the LES disburses equitable share funds without the need for matching requirements on the part of
municipalities. To estimate Equation (12), two versions ￿a linear form model and its logarithmic
version are speci￿ed. These are expressed as:
Qi = ￿0 + ￿1Li + ￿2Gi + ￿3Pi + ￿4Isi + "i (13)
where the subscript idenotes the i￿th municipality. The logarithmic counterpart of Equation (13)










Equation (13) can also be speci￿ed as:
‘nQi = ￿0 + ￿1‘nLi + ￿2‘nGi + ￿3‘nPi + ￿4‘nIsi + "i (15)
At present, the LES formula uses a basic approach to proxy revenue raising capacity by utilizing the relationship
between demonstrated revenue-raising capacity among municipalities that provide detailed ￿nancial information, and
objective municipal information obtained from Statistics South Africa.
7For example, while the Department of Transport is currently involved in classifying roads, there remains sig-
ni￿cant ambiguity on whether some roads are to be placed under the administration of district, provincial or local
authorities.
10In estimating Equations (13) and (15), it is important that the examination of the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect
should be conducted using the most appropriate estimation technique, where such a technique yields
consistent and e¢ cient estimators. As noted by Gujarati (1995), this implies taking cognizance of the
simultaneity problem; where there is no simultaneity problem, then the ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimation method will produce consistent and e¢ cient estimators. However, where simultaneity is
detected, then other methods such as the two-stage least squares (2SLS) and instrumental variables
(IV) approaches will give estimators that consistent and e¢ cient. On this basis, the ￿rst step in
our analysis is to verify the exogeneity of the grant variable. This is done via the application
of Hausman￿ s speci￿cation test which uses the variables L;P;Is and municipal population size as
exogenous and instrumental variables. The use of the three variables as exogenous variables and
instruments is premised the understanding that the LES formula allocates funding on the basis
of three factors: (i) expenditure needs, (ii) ￿scal capacity, and (iii) demographic characteristics of
municipalities. In the ￿rst step of the test, the grant variable (G) is regressed on all exogenous
variables and instruments, and the residuals retrieved. In the second step, we re-estimate a version
of equation (14) that includes the residuals from the ￿rst regression as additional regressors (for
details about the test see Gujarati, 1995 and Maddala, 1989). The results of the two step Hausman
test are presented in Table 3 as:
According to the Hausman speci￿cation test, if OLS estimates are consistent, then the coe¢ cient
on the ￿rst stage residuals should not be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. From Table 3 above, the
test indicates that the coe¢ cient of the ￿rst stage residuals (RES G) is not statistically signi￿cant,
thus allowing for the non-rejection of the null hypothesis (of consistent OLS estimates) and the
conclusion that G is exogenously determined with respect to expenditure at the local government
sphere. This ￿nding is also consistent with the exposition on the local government grant process as
outlined in section 3 of this paper. While the results presented in Table 3 are based on the results of
regressing the variables in logarithmic form, similar results and conclusions are obtained when the
variables are expressed in linear form. The ￿nding that G is exogenous allows for the estimation of
equations (13) and (15) using OLS. The results obtained are reported in Table 4 below.
Table 4 presents estimates obtained from both the linear and logarithmic regressions. To deter-
mine the appropriate functional form, Ramsey￿ s regression speci￿cation error test (RESET) is used.
The result shows that the model in logarithmic form is not misspeci￿ed and based on the estimated
standard error of the regression (SEE), that the model speci￿cation in logarithmic form ￿ts the data
better than the linear speci￿cation. The analysis that follows is thus based on estimates obtained
from the regression of the logarithmic speci￿cation in Equation (15). For convenient interpretation
and comparison, the elasticities of the explanatory variables in Table 5 are evaluated at sample
means and converted into marginal e⁄ects on local government expenditure. All the estimated co-
e¢ cients on the independent variables are statistically signi￿cant at the 10 percent (or better) level
although, the signs for P and Is do not conform to a priori expectations. Turning our attention to
two variables of interest ￿G and L, we note that evaluated at the means, the marginal e⁄ect of own-
revenues on local government spending is estimated to be 0.89. This indicates that that a marginal
1 percent increase in collections from own revenue sources increases local government spending by
0.89 percent. On the other hand, the elasticity of expenditure at the local government sphere with
respect to unconditional grants transfers is about 0.05, indicating that an extra 1 percent increase
in LES allocations to municipalities increases local government expenditures by a mere 0.05 percent.
The veri￿cation of the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect hypothesis requires the existence of a relatively larger response
in local government expenditures (Q) to changes in unconditional grants (G) as against income gen-
erated from own revenue sources (L). However, the ￿nding that ￿Q=￿G < ￿Q=￿L (or 0.05 < 0.89)
yields no evidence in support of the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect in South Africa￿ s local government institutional
setting, a ￿nding similar to those reported in developed country studies (see for example Becker,
1994 and Worthington and Dollery, 1999).
Most developed country studies examining ￿ ypaper e⁄ect of sub-national grants (see for exam-
ple Heyndels and Smolders, 1994) have reported a negative coe¢ cient for the tax price variable, P.
11Following from the relationship between prices and demand, increases in sub-national government
taxes that raise the costs of public goods would have the e⁄ect of dampening consumption of such
goods. The consequence of any decrease in demand will be a reduction in spending undertaken by
sub-national authorities. While the ￿nding in this study of a positive coe¢ cient for P contradicts a
priori expectations, it perhaps captures the ￿accountability￿obligation of local government author-
ities in South Africa. According to Grewal (1995) and Webb (2005), this obligation represents the
political cost to government for imposing taxes. The accountability obligation also requires authori-
ties to demonstrate that tax is necessary and the revenue collected through any increases to the tax
obligations of citizens will in turn be utilized e⁄ectively in the provision of services. This argument
becomes more plausible when one considers recent policies and legislation enacted to enhance the
sustainability and management of funds at the local government sphere,8 and the ￿nding that the
most in￿ uential factor (in terms of marginal e⁄ects) on local government expenditure appears to be
incomes derived from own revenue sources.
At a ￿rst glance, the result indicating the non-existence of ￿ ypaper e⁄ect in South Africa, the
small but statistically signi￿cant marginal impact of grant allocations on local government expendi-
ture and perhaps more importantly, the negative correlation between Is and per capita expenditures
of local government might be considered implausible. However, a brief contextualization of the local
government landscape could help provide some insights into this anomaly. The uneven state of
municipalities￿administrative and skilled capacity has been identi￿ed as perhaps the greatest risk
to municipal performance and equitable service provision in South Africa￿ s communities. In recent
years, national government￿ s plan of action on spurring economic growth and social development
have continually emphasized the need to (i) strengthen skills and spending capacity in local gov-
ernment to achieve delivery targets, and (ii) ensuring that local governments function e⁄ectively
and e¢ ciently. The lack of skilled personnel, especially at middle and senior management level in
many local governments has signi￿cantly constrained the capacity of municipalities in adequately
drawing up integrated development plans crucial for the eradication of socio-economic infrastructure
backlogs and the implementation of service delivery programs. For poorly capacitated municipali-
ties, the potential consequences of the failure to fully adhere with stringent accounting and ￿nancial
management frameworks (as outlined in the Municipal Finance Management Act [MFMA] of 2003)
has led to some resistance on the part of municipal o¢ cials to undertake spending programs. The
lack of institutional and administrative capacity has also limited the ability of many municipalities
to collect and spend budgets, especially funds earmarked for capital expenditures.9
In order to support the expenditure needs of municipalities with regard to delivery of essential
social services, total conditional and unconditional grant allocations to the local government sphere
have increased from R2.1 billion in 1998 to approximately R40 billion by the 2007/08 ￿nancial year
(National Treasury, 2007). Despite this, the results and outputs have been mixed; while enormous
strides have been made in tackling poverty and providing basic services to South Africa￿ s disadvan-
taged citizens, service delivery backlogs still exist in key areas, presenting a number of challenges
to municipalities in ful￿lling their service delivery mandate (National Treasury, 2005). While there
has been a substantial increase in grant transfers, an audit of municipalities in 2004 revealed the
extent of underspending by municipal authorities. Some 203 out of the 284 municipalities are unable
to provide sanitation to an estimated 40 percent (about 5 million) of their residents, while an esti-
mated 37 municipalities can not provide any form of free basic electricity. In addition, 36 percent of
8Most notably the enactment of the Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act (2007) is expected to bring about
changes to the local government ￿scal framework through the introduction of taxes and regulation of certain municipal
surcharges.
9According to the 2006 local government review, realized expenditure for metropolitan municipalities grew by
R2,5-billion between 2001 and 2005 (or by 43% a year over this period).Capital expenditure for local municipalities
increased annually by 30% over the same period. However, these increases were o⁄ a very low base. For instance, the
Nelson Mandela Bay Metro, which has one of the biggest municipal budgets at R3,6-billion, had only spent 4,9% of
its capital budget at the end of September2005. Similarly, metropolitan authorities in Johannesburg and Cape Town
had only spent 9,2% and 7.7% of their capital budgets, respectively.
12South Africa￿ s population lacks access to piped water either in their dwelling or yard, and around
3.7 million citizens (or around 8 percent of the population) completely lack access to water (Mail
and Guardian, 2006). Informed by the potential impact that poor administrative capacity and skill
de￿cit problems could have on service delivery functions of local governments, the Department of
Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) developed a support initiative program for local govern-
ments called ￿Project Consolidate￿ . In brief, the initiative is basically a program of coordinated
interventions aimed at assisting targeted municipalities in overcoming challenges of capacity build-
ing and addressing practical issues of service delivery, revenue collection, ￿nancial management &
reporting and local governance.10
6 Concluding Remarks
In the context of the South African local government grant process, this paper attempted to empir-
ically examine the concept of ￿scal illusion using the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect hypothesis. Based on 2005/06
￿nancial year data drawn from 237 municipalities, the results suggest that in comparison to uncondi-
tional grant transfers to municipalities, incomes derived from own revenue sources have higher (and
positive) marginal e⁄ects on local government expenditures. Thus, evidence of intergovernmental
grant transfers having a ￿ ypaper e⁄ect on municipal expenditures in South Africa can be refuted.
Two major policy implications emerge from the analysis of the empirical results. First, there is
a need to improve the overall administrative, institutional and ￿nancial capacity of municipalities.
Such improvements can have a positive impact on the e¢ ciency of expenditure spending by munic-
ipalities in South Africa. In particular, policies aimed at enhancing the ability and innovation of
municipalities in e⁄ectively spending their grant allocations can help bring about improvements in
the implementation of service delivery initiatives as well as address the signi￿cant backlogs in socio-
economic infrastructure. Second and perhaps more importantly, a high degree of attention need
to be focused on the potential e⁄ects that current reform proposals will have on ￿scal autonomy
and revenue raising capacity of municipalities. At a macro-level, total local government revenues
accounting for over 16 percent of all revenues generated by the three spheres of government and is
equivalent to about 5 percent of South Africa￿ s gross domestic product (GDP). Policy initiatives and
changes to key legislation on the ￿nancing framework of municipalities has seen (i) the introduction
of the Municipal Property Rates Act of July 2005 which ushered in a new and uniform property
rating system for the local government sphere; (ii) the abolition of RSC levies with e⁄ect from July
2006 and as an interim measure, its replacement by a national grant pending the introduction of
alternative tax instrument(s)11; and (iii) an ongoing process of restructuring the electricity distrib-
ution industry into six ￿nancially viable and independent regional electricity distributors (REDs).
Through legislation, municipalities will be encouraged to participate in the six REDs with income
derived through two possible streams ￿dividends from REDs pro￿ts or a municipal levy on electricity
(where such levy conforms to the uniform national regulation and tari⁄ settling framework).
The reforms outlined above have serious implications for predictability and adequacy of revenue
￿ ows, as well as for the ￿scal autonomy of municipal authorities. With the abolishment of RSC
levies, metropolitan and district authorities have expressed concerns that alternative tax instruments
might fail to yield enough revenue to compensate for the loss of funds derived from RSC levies. In
addition, questions have arisen as to whether in the interim period, the size of transitional grant
t re￿ ects revenues that could potentially have being raised from RSC levies. With a total of 173
municipalities licensed as electricity distributors and serving an estimated 52 percent of the 7 million
10For greater understanding about Project Consolidate see documents listed on DPLG￿ s website at www.dplg.gov.za.
11For details and review of alternative tax proposals see (a) National Treasury
discussion document: Options for the Replacement of RSC and JSB Levies (available at
www.treasury.gov.za); and (b) the Financial and Fiscal Commission￿ s submission document:
Comments on National Treasury￿ s Proposals for the Replacement of RSC and JSB Levies (available at
www.⁄c.co.za).
13electricity consumers in South Africa, proposed reforms to the electricity industry could result in
municipalities experiencing signi￿cant losses in their revenues, where such losses emanate from (i) the
inability of licensed municipalities to derive revenues from surcharges levied on electricity sales; and
(ii) reliance on dividend income that by nature is unpredictable as it depends on ￿rm pro￿tability and
shareholder decisions on dividend declarations. he Also, the suggested uniform national regulation
and tari⁄-setting structure envisaged for the REDs can be viewed as reducing the ￿scal autonomy of
municipalities. In the long-term, ambiguity and unpredictability of the impact of reform initiatives
on revenue ￿ ows could adversely impact on the ability of municipal authorities to formulate proper
planning and budgeting requirements, requirements that are crucial to enhancing the delivery of
essential basic services. It is therefore imperative that decisions on reforms to existing revenue
sources and introduction of new ones should (i) ensure that ￿scal autonomy of municipalities is not
compromised; (ii) be aligned with assignment of powers and functions to municipalities, and (iii)
ensure that revenue ￿ ows are adequate enough to fund the expenditure functions of municipalities.
It is important that some caution be observed in interpreting the results and subsequent expla-
nations. The ￿nding of a negative relationship between unconditional grant allocations and expen-
ditures at the local government sphere might be as a result of potential aggregation bias. While
negative impact of increased grant allocation on service delivery expenditures may hold for poorly
capacitated municipalities (especially in rural areas), the opposite could be the case for municipal-
ities covering large urban centers and towns where higher levels of administrative and institutional
capacity has contributed to sound ￿scal practices and vastly improved service delivery outcomes.12
However, in the absence of detailed, consistent and comparable data collected over some adequate
time period, comprehensive analysis that would (a) take into account speci￿c characteristics common
to the di⁄erent categories of municipalities, and (b) provide an alternative framework (such as ￿xed
and random e⁄ects model or a general equilibrium framework) for modeling the decision variables
of municipal authorities was outside the scope of this paper.
The shortcomings of this paper should therefore be noted and turned into areas for future re-
search. The model used is a relatively simple framework for describing an aggregated determination
of expenditure at the local sphere. Hence, it can be viewed as a simple expositional tool for a ￿rst
attempt at analyzing the e⁄ects of grant transfers within the general context of ￿scal illusion using a
speci￿c hypothesis. Future research aimed at examining further potential ￿scal illusionary e⁄ects of
grant transfers in South Africa would be enhanced by (i) availability of data detailing institutional
constraints impacting on the spending and taxing decisions of municipalities; (ii) applying other
underlying hypotheses underpinning the concept of ￿scal illusion to South African data; and (iii)
analyzing grant e⁄ects using relatively more sophisticated statistical methods that take into account
a range of demographic and economic characteristics peculiar to di⁄erent categories of municipalities
in South Africa.
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181 APPENDIX A: THE CURRENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT
EQUITABLE SHARE
Each municipality i receives a per capita LES allocation of Gi, de￿ned as:
Gi = ScGi + COi (1)
where ScGidenotes scaled grant per capita, and COi is the correction factor. The scaled grant
per capita is calculated as:
ScGi = ￿(BSi + ISi) ￿ RRCi (2)
where BS and IS refer to the basic services and institutional support components, and RRC to
revenue-raising capacity, and
BSi = ￿ j(poorserviced;ij ￿ S1j + poorunserviced;ij ￿ S2j) (3)
where
￿ the subscripts j run over the four basic services, electricity, water, refuse collection, and sani-
tation,
￿ poorserviced;ijis the number of poor households receiving service j in local government i,
￿ poorunserviced;ijis the number of poor households not receiving service j in local government I,
￿ S1j is the annual service cost for those poor households receiving public service j and
￿ S2jis the annual service cost for poor households not receiving public service j. 1 The monthly
service costs used in the 2005/06 formula are listed in Table E.17 of Annexure E of National
Treasury￿ s 2005 Budget Review.
￿ ISj = ￿+￿*popi+￿*couni, popiis the population of local government i and couniis the number
of councilor seats in local government i.
For the 2005/06 LES allocation, the following parameter values are used:
￿ = R350,000; ￿ = R1; and ￿ = R36,000.
RRCi = ￿ * imputed revenue-raising capacity in i. For the 2005/06 ￿scal year, ￿ was set at 5
percent.
￿ = scalefactor = (TotES + ￿iRRCi)=￿i(BSi + ISi) (4)
where TotES is the total local government equitable share as determined by parliament. For the
2005/06 ￿nancial year it was set at R 9,343,365,000. For 2005/06 ￿ = 1.681313553.
COi= a correction factor to prevent large changes in allocations. For each local government, a
minimum guarantee amount (MINi) has been de￿ned as the indicative amount for this year indicated
in the previous Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). Local governments for which the
scaled grant (ScGi) is less than MINi, receive a positive correction or ￿topup￿equal to MINi ￿
ScGi. Local governments whose scaled grant is greater than MINiare considered to have a ￿surplus￿
and receive a negative correction equal to that local government￿ s share of the total amount of
all ￿top-ups￿ . Municipality i￿ s share is thus equal to its surplus (ScGi ￿MINi) divided to the sum
of all surpluses.
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Source: National Treasury Budget Review (2005). Legend: RSC – Regional Services Council Levy; PR- property rates; SOCSERV-social services (water, electricity, sanitation 
and waste removal); GRANT – grant and subsidies. 
 
 
Figure 4: Composition of Transfers of Nationally Raised Revenues to Local Government Sphere - 






























Source: National Treasury Budget Review (2005). Legend: SCGA: share of conditional grant allocations in total intergovernmental grant transfers to the local government sphere; 














Total expenditure of municipal authorities (per capita) 
Y  Total revenues generated by municipalities (per capita; where revenues include intergovernmental transfers [G] and own-
source income [L]) 
P  Fiscal or revenue raising capacity of municipal authorities (in per capita terms) 
IS  Expenditure needs (per capita) 
 
 























L  1052.69 830.74  87.04  4181.94 
G  230.12 81.10  77.47 467.50 
P  6.94 9.53 0.14 73.61 
IS  170.18 57.69  71.83 338.71 
 
 









Intercept .50987  2.012 
(.045) 
L  .88062 25.452 
(.000) 
G  1.1542 1.908 
(.058) 
P  .16512 5.581 
(.000) 
Is  -1.225 -1.881 
(.061) 










Note: RES G denotes residuals derived from first regression of the grant variable against chosen exogenous and instrumental variables.  


















22Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates 
 
 
Dependent Variable Q 
 
    
Regression Estimates of the Linear Model      





















Tests and Diagnostics 
 


























 Regression Estimates of the Logarithmic Model 
 
    



















  -0.0404 
























Note: For coefficient estimates, asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 99, 95 and 90% levels, respectively. For the coefficient 
estimates of the linear and logarithmic models, figures in parentheses are corresponding standard errors. The following diagnostic tests are reported. 
SEE refers to the standard error of the regression while Adj. R
2  expresses the ratio of explained sum of squares to total sum of squares (adjusted for 
degrees of freedom). Both are indicators of “goodness of fit” requiring that SEE be as small as possible and Adj. R
2  be as close to unity as possible. The 
DW statistic  denotes the Durbin-Watson tests for serial correlation; as a rule of thumb, if the statistic is found to be around 2, it can be assumed that 
there is no first-order serial correlation. Serial correlation refers to the Lagrange multiplier statistic that specifically tests whether the disturbances are 
autocorrelated up to order 1. Functional form shows the result of Ramsey’s RESET tests using the square of fitted values. Normality shows the results of the 
testing of skewness and kurtosis of the residuals while Heteroscedasticity captures the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values to establish 
whether the disturbances have constant variance. A “chi-square” (χ
2 ) statistic is shown for each of the diagnostics, and the comparison with critical 
values determining whether the regression passes the tests. The order is given in the notation p of  χp. At the 95% significance level, the critical values are 
3.84 for p=2  and 5.99 for  p =2. Figures in parentheses next to the individual chi-square statistic shows within what percentage of the distribution the 
individual statistic is found (De Vita et al, 2006).  
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